



LEARNING FROM OTHERS

Four case studies of meanwhile land use:
financial relationships, business models, partners,
stakeholders, commercial arrangements and
success.

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EXTRAORDINARY CHALLENGES REQUIRE EXTRAORDINARY SOLUTIONS.

"IF IT DOES NOT HAPPEN, IT WILL NOT BE FOR THE LACK OF BLOOD, SWEAT AND TEARS AND OTHERS WILL OBSERVE, LEARN, COLLABORATE AND ACHIEVE SOMETHING THAT IS BOTH AUTHENTIC AND DISTINCTIVE FOR THEIR TOWNS AND CITIES. AND THAT WILL MAKE A REAL DIFFERENCE TO THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE THERE. THAT IS WHAT IT IS REALLY ALL ABOUT."

London Pleasure Gardens (Feb 2012)

Dutton, C. Armstrong, D. (2012) Volume 5 Number 4. Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal. The 4th dimension = Meanwhile London: 329

PREFACE

This research was compiled by principal investigators Coda Architects Ltd and Common Capital with collaborators from Pop-Up Bristol and Cardiff University. The four partners came together in September 2012 to deliver this piece of work for the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) because of their like-minded perspective.

As a team we approached this work unashamedly with **three** explicit assumptions. **First**, we believe that to create truly successful and sustainable outcomes we must consider social, environmental and economic factors equally - not only economic growth. **Second**, that somehow community involvement, engagement and participation are critical to determining the perceived success of meanwhile use developments.

‘Meanwhile Use’ developments literally occupy spaces in realms between the festival scene and the built environment; between the formal economy and community action; and between the fleeting and the long-term. Various approaches to regeneration have been advocated, tested and applied over many decades with mixed success in both rural and urban settings, long before the term ‘Meanwhile Use’ became popular. Our **third** assumption then, is that a critical appraisal of emergent practice must be helpful and indeed necessary for meanwhile developments to successfully support future models of regeneration.

The opportunity to investigate effective models for the delivery of ‘Meanwhile Use’ developments was therefore a hugely exciting one. We would like to thank all those people who joined the discussion, allowed us to visit their sites and contributed so much in interviews. A special thank you goes to the commissioning team at The London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) for having the foresight to see the potential value in this work; The Greater London Authority (GLA) for their candid support; the photos supplied by the Shambala Festival Team, and the Experimental Psychologists at the University of Bristol.



COMMON CAPITAL




“IF MAPPED OUT CORRECTLY, THIS COULD BECOME A VIABLE AND REPLICABLE MODEL FOR FUTURE DEVELOPERS, COUNCILS AND CREATIVE ENTREPRENEURS.”


Dutton, C. Armstrong, D. (2012) Volume 5 Number 4. Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal. The 4th dimension = Meanwhile London: 328

The three models presented below depict the evolving relationships of three key factors which affect our well-being.


Model A: Economic factors dominate, with less importance given to environmental and social concerns.



Model B: Economic, environmental and social concerns converge.



Model C: True sustainability - achieved between economic, social and environmental factors.



Source: www.absconsulting.com



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Against a backdrop of almost unparalleled financial and economic uncertainty, we are seeing increased interest in meanwhile use of empty assets with a view to supporting enterprise and innovation, creativity and quality of life in the UK. While the occupation of shops, offices and other empty buildings has been relatively well documented, *meanwhile land use* has received less attention. Yet there is so much to learn.

*"AN EMERGING CONSENSUS THAT IF CAREFULLY AND SENSITIVELY MANAGED, TEMPORARY USES CAN ADD COMMERCIAL AND SOCIAL VALUE."*¹

There is little evidence of what constitutes and drives success, and equally limited guidance for practitioners, landlords and funders of meanwhile land use. In this light, the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) commissioned research into the delivery of grassroots interim use. CODA Architects, Common Capital, Pop-Up Bristol and Cardiff University have responded through this research in order to help LLDC more successfully enable the activation of the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park and surrounding neighbourhoods.

The aim of this work has been to critically dissect, analyse and evaluate a number of meanwhile use developments. We have examined how a number of projects have been delivered, with a particular focus on finance, collaboration, community involvement, success, business model and the commissioning and procurement perspective. We reviewed the relevant literature, held regular meetings with LLDC and others and undertook structured interviews with those close to our 4 case studies.

- Bristol Urban Beach was a multi- functional space providing a range of services and activities in central Bristol. for 6 weeks.
- Caravanserai is intended to be a "trading post" in Canning Town. It is a new public square enclosed by units to be used by local community groups, artists and traders; food stalls and cafés, a small covered stage, a bar and workshop space.
- Creative Common is a seasonal tented event space in Bristol for 6 months of the year over 3 years and the potential for wider revenue generating activities including retail, markets, workshops and restaurant.
- The Diesel Depot site will be the "central growing and distribution hub" for The Severn Project's agricultural production in Bristol over the next few years.





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Examining the business model, commercial arrangements, nature and extent of community engagement and the perceived success and various other characteristics of each case study suggested a number of conclusions of potentially wider significance for meanwhile land use.

Our 4 case studies also prompted us to reflect on the nature of the financial relationship between funder and funded, landlord and occupier, in terms of revenue funding (commissioning / procurement, revenue grants, leasing / concessions) or capital (lending, risk capital or capital grants). Public or quasi-public landlords and funders may also support the success of such developments through non- financial support, such as infrastructure, legal and financial support, etc.

For practitioners, we believe that those taking forward meanwhile projects will often need to prepare themselves for the following:

- Challenging relationships and tensions with those not used to meanwhile use.
- Complex funding, regulatory and collaboration patchworks with the onus is often on the entrepreneur to do the stitching, with significant transaction costs.
- A need to consider the needs, demands, expectations and preferences of the local community. And to engage successfully with the local communities.
- Subjective measures perceptions of success.
- Varying degrees of skills and capacity required at different stages in a project's life cycle.
- Tough market conditions, unknown levels of footfall to the site and assumptions on the viability of meanwhile use development.
- A financial model based on "no cost, no revenue" or 'income and expenditure' project model versus a more ambitious 'invest and return' or 'enterprise' model.

We believe that in taking forward the London Legacy Development Corporations ambitions for meanwhile use developments on the Olympic Park, the LLDC (and indeed other landlords in other circumstances) should consider:

- The financial case for meanwhile use, not only in terms of the income and expenditure linked to development but also in terms of cost savings (e.g. reduced security and maintenance) and changes in the value of land and other assets.
- Providing clarity over terms, tenure and the site itself.
- When seeking to enable meanwhile activity across multiple sites, that a sufficient proportion of activities need to be attractions in themselves, while other less 'destination' activities may benefit from being clustered, and that sites should complement rather than undermine each other's viability.
- Encourage and select occupiers with regard to the suitability of their vision to the physical characteristics of the site and with a view to the demands, needs, expectations and preferences of the community, in whatever form that takes.
- How meanwhile leases can be structured to enable practitioners to secure external investment .
- Advertising to a diverse range of potential occupants, holding competitions or issuing calls for ideas. Whilst some occupants might be architects and designers, or those working in collaboration, the focus for a large proportion of the land should be for start-up business and entrepreneurship. Looking to local businesses, graduates, students, social enterprises and community groups will add diversity and may established networks of pro bono support, with a greater chance of delivery success.
- Hosting a continuous series of events to encourage footfall

As a potential funder, the LLDC (and indeed other public bodies) should:

- Recognise the spectrum of commercial and community-led approaches to meanwhile use.
- Consider the need for funding relationships to reflect the underlying business model of the occupier.
- Consider the need to give clarity and support to project partners as early as possible about the parameters of the potential terms of any financial support available.,
- Help fund 'hardware', for speed of occupancy of land, such as:
 - Physical capital
 - Groundworks
 - Infrastructure
 - Signage
 - Storage space
 - Wi-Fi
 - Toilets and showers (key code)
 - Cash machines and card readers
 - An integrated schedule of events
 - Monitoring policy
 - Security
 - Hoardings





- Select occupants and leaders based on software assets, such as, human capital, skills, experience, energy, drive, availability of time, motivation etc. required to deliver this style of development.
- Clearly identify one lead 'case officer' to liaise with the meanwhile practitioner and support them to navigate the legal hurdles and planning regime, for example.
- Give due regard to formal processes (procurement law, state aid law, etc.), whilst maintaining a healthy appetite for risk, exploiting flexibility in discretionary budgets, and proportionate monitoring and reporting, etc.
- Stay flexible and be prepared to problem solve as unexpected issues are likely to arise as is the nature of new businesses and construction work.
- Approach business rates in a consistent, fair and transparent manner.
- Consider the costs and benefits of providing financial support to enable meanwhile use. This may require the development of an investment model to weigh up various options. Such a model would forecast the financial implications of doing nothing, security costs, whether meanwhile use brought in additional money to the site, if land values changed, etc.
- Consider the role for an intermediary support agency or even a more fully-fledged meanwhile development agency to take on the role of delivering the financial and meanwhile strategy of the public body, attracting investment from other sources and providing specialist meanwhile expertise.

We believe that meanwhile land use can offer potentially exciting opportunities to test and enable new models of entrepreneurship and innovation which blend economic, social and environmental motivations. There can be no meanwhile land use rule book or one off -the-shelf business plan but meanwhile practitioners are keen to share their experiences, and we are more likely to succeed through humility, sharing lessons learned and working together.

Commissioners, procurement professionals and landlords can create the right incentives to enable successful meanwhile use which in turn delivers them a return on their investment. The success and viability of meanwhile land use will be driven not only through good design, architectural look-and-feel and the cultural cachet of innovation but are also grounded in the technical details, business models, commercial and financial arrangements which underpin each enterprise.

People matter. First, as success is contingent, not least upon the perceptions of the communities which have an interest in the sites on which meanwhile use take place, making appropriate engagement with relevant community crucial to success. But also given the range of skills, capacities and capabilities required for a multi-disciplinary, multi-functional start-up enterprise to literally build itself up from the ground.

We hope these case studies, the lessons learned and our recommendations can help LLDC, meanwhile practitioners and others develop improved models of collaboration which better align incentives in the mutual interest and enable the successful creative, commercial and community-led animation of empty spaces across the UK and further afield.

CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND

In September 2008 the UK economy was lurching into a period of almost unparalleled financial and economic uncertainty; sparked by the financial crisis, but also linked to underlying systemic imbalances. As old models are no longer trusted, and uncertainty becomes the norm, many of the edifices and aspirations founded before the crisis lay wasted. The emergence of a culture of temporary or interim 'pop-up' and 'meanwhile' use is perhaps no surprise.

Interest in the meanwhile use of residential and commercial properties, including empty shops, offices and parcels of land has come from policy makers and politicians, architects, academics, economists, community activists and social entrepreneurs. Each bring their own motivations. For some meanwhile use offers opportunities for entrepreneurship and innovation, to boost the UK economy. For others, creativity and cultural outcomes are at stake; it's the chance to improve the quality of life of local communities. There are a number of authors providing case study reportage of temporary architecture and meanwhile land use. Most recently, Peter Bishop and Lesley Williams' *'Temporary City'* explores the origins and drivers behind the meanwhile phenomenon and places such development within modern planning theory and practice:

"REFLECT A BOTTOM-UP CURRENT WITHIN SOCIETY WHEREBY PEOPLE ARE STARTING TO REAPPROPRIATE THEIR CITIES AND TO COLONISE THEM IN NEW WAYS TO SUIT EMERGING NEEDS AND LIFESTYLES. THE GROWTH IN ACTIVISM IS BOTH PART OF A TOP-DOWN DRIVE TO ENCOURAGE ACTIVE COMMUNITIES AND DIMINISH THE BURDEN ON THE STATE, AND A GRASSROOTS DESIRE TO 'DO SOMETHING', ANYTHING, RATHER THAN FACE LONG-TERM UNEMPLOYMENT."¹

While the occupation of shops, offices and other empty buildings could be said to have been relatively straightforward, or at least better documented, the experience and models of temporary animation of larger tracts of urban land have received less critical attention. There exists a wealth of online documentation advocating the benefits of meanwhile approaches more widely, including references to successful case studies within the UK and Germany in particular. In 2010 the then Development Trusts Association (DTA) commissioned SQW Consulting to research the nature and extent of meanwhile use in the UK. Their report, *'Meanwhile Use Business Case and Learning Points'*, was published in May 2010 and goes some way to outline the available support and funding sources for interested practitioners.

The occupation of (often publicly owned) empty land can bring with it the complexities of a building project, the uncertainty of the start-up enterprise, financial pressures, a patchwork of accountability to landlords and/or funders and the strong opinions of a local community with vested interests. So delivering success against these pressures can require a host of experience and skills, which an individual or organisation may never have previously assembled or tested. Harnessing the appropriate skills; creating the basic infrastructure; negotiating with landlords, public agencies and stakeholders; co-ordinating with contractors and creating a viable business model are significant challenges. Peter Bishop makes a case for multi-disciplinary actors:

"MANY TEMPORARY PHENOMENA APPEAR TO OCCUPY A POSITION AT THE CUTTING EDGE OF CREATIVITY, WHERE THE TRADITIONAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT TYPES OF ACTIVITIES ARE LESS CLEAR, THE ACTORS ARE INCREASINGLY MULTI-DISCIPLINARY."²

¹ Bishop, P. and Williams, L. (2012) *The Temporary City*, Routledge. 213

² Bishop, P. and Williams, L. (2012) *The Temporary City*, Routledge. 213





The development of publicly owned land seems to have met varying degrees of success and failure. But what determines the perceived success of meanwhile use developments has also received little attention until now. While there may be **“AN EMERGING CONSENSUS THAT IF CAREFULLY AND SENSITIVELY MANAGED, TEMPORARY USES CAN ADD COMMERCIAL AND SOCIAL VALUE,”**¹ this remains an assertion backed up by little or no evidence.

Often, developments have been championed by creative individuals, architects and organisations with existing and competing workloads, and delivered with the support of volunteers, pro bono contributions and recently graduated trainee architects. Projects are often delivered at stretched capacity, with a passion to leave a mark on the urban realm, but lacking the ingredients of a financially viable and underlying business model in this context. Success in the eyes of observers is not always guaranteed.

There is an under-appreciated need to support the efforts of commissioning authorities, procurement professionals and landlords in enabling meanwhile use. This means helping them better understand the outcomes they are seeking; what success looks like; what represents value for money; and how financial, social and environmental value can be created. At present there is little guidance available for public authorities acting as landlords, funders and investors in creative, community or meanwhile projects. For instance, English Partnerships published a case study report on surplus public sector land (Making Best Use of Surplus Public Sector Assets) before becoming part of HCA on 1 December 2008, which advocates partnership working and flexible approaches, but makes no reference to meanwhile uses.

In this light, the London Legacy Development Corporation (LLDC) commissioned research into the delivery of grassroots interim use. CODA Architects in collaboration with Common Capital, Pop-Up Bristol and Cardiff University responded by proposing to deliver this research to help LLDC understand the success and otherwise of delivery models, with a view to promoting successful activation of the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park and surrounding neighbourhoods. In one sense, “The Olympic Games is the biggest meanwhile project”². So having succeeded once, at a cost of billions of pounds, the challenge now is for East London to succeed again, and this time for nothing.

1 Bishop, P. and Williams, L. (2012) *The Temporary City*, Routledge. 215
 2 Dutton, C. Armstrong, D. (2012) Volume 5 Number 4. *Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal*. The 4th dimension = Meanwhile London: 326





AIM AND METHODOLOGY

"DESPITE THE UNPREDICTABLE NATURE OF THE JOURNEY, THE PROCESS ITSELF NEEDS TO BE CHOREOGRAPHED. IN CHOREOGRAPHING THE PROCESS, THE DESIGNER WILL, AT TIMES, HAVE TO BE PREPARED TO CONCENTRATE ON CREATING THE CONDITIONS RATHER THAN THE SOLUTIONS."

Bishop, P. and Williams, L. (2012) *The Temporary City*, Routledge. 216

The aim of this work has been to critically dissect, analyse and evaluate a number of meanwhile use developments through a programme of research. We have sought to examine how a number of projects have been delivered, successes and failures. In doing so, we have explored a number of characteristics of meanwhile projects, including finance, collaboration, community involvement, business model, creativity, commissioning and procurement. Our particular focus has included a focus on:

- approaches to sustainable funding and financing
- different business models
- maximising benefits to a range of sectors and partners
- strategies to deal with statutory processes and requirements efficiently

Our programme of work included a literature review and desk-based research; regular meetings with LLDC and other partner organisations; a series of structured interviews with delivery practitioners leading design and delivery, external stakeholders, and commissioners, landlords and budget-holders, as well as collation of relevant photographic evidence and other material. Our 4 case studies were selected on the basis of familiarity, access to key actors, encouragement from LLDC and our own interests.




CASE STUDY 4a

Bristol Urban Beach

"RESEARCH HAS SHOWN THAT HOW WELL A PLACE WORKS FOR CHILDREN CAN BE A GOOD INDICATOR OF ITS OVERALL QUALITY. IN OTHER WORDS, IF IT WORKS WELL FOR CHILDREN THEN IT TENDS TO WORK WELL FOR OTHER GROUPS, PARTICULARLY THOSE THAT TEND TO BE MARGINALISED IN CITIES, INCLUDING OLDER PEOPLE AND DISABLED PEOPLE."

Mean, M. Johar, I. Gale, T. DEMOS, Report: (2008) The Bristol Beach: an experiment in place-making. 12



In November 2006 an idea emerged through conversations with local residents from the Redcliff Futures group to create a temporary beach. This was then spearheaded by a resident through the organisation that she worked for, DEMOS. It took 9 months to find the necessary funding, design and organise the project to be on site for 6 weeks in the summer of 2007.

Overview


Project summary:	A beach was created for 6 weeks with trader stands and facilities to hire deck chairs and play equipment.
Location:	Redcliffe Wharf, Bristol
Programme:	Beach, buying food and drink, deck chair hire, daytime workshops, board meeting space
Initiator:	Lead entrepreneur from think-tank DEMOS
Project Duration:	6 weeks (August 2007)
Lead Time:	9 months
Site Area:	6400m ²
Client Team:	Bristol City Council (BCC)
Project Team:	<p>DEMOS - a think-tank focused on power and politics. They aim to challenge policymaking by giving a voice to people and communities, and involving them closely in research.</p> <p>Architecture 00:/ - an architecture practice.</p> <p>Muf Architects - an architecture practice.</p> <p>NEST Building - a building firm</p> <p>Skanska - Manage development, construction and infrastructure processes, from design to facilities management.</p> <p>Arup - a firm of designers, planners, engineers, consultants and technical specialists offering a broad range of professional services.</p>

Overview

Opening Times:	Bristol Urban Beach was open throughout the day and in to the evening.
Funding Sources:	Total: c. £120,000 South West of England Regional Development Agency (SWERDA) £30,000, Bristol City Council (BCC) £20,000, Hewlett Packard - £20,000, Private developer £20,000, Converging Worlds £20,000. £10,000 food and drink concessions
Funding Type:	Grant
Profitability/Loss:	Broke even but no fees were paid to the architect or DEMOS Staff.
Permissions / Permits:	Permission to use site, temporary event licence, health and safety, environmental assessment and planning permit made to Bristol City Council
Local Links:	Café food supplied by Bar Wars, Bordeaux Quay, Richmond Events, Community Waste, Pieminister, Bristol Wireless.
Publicity/advertising:	Blog, Great Western Radio (GWR), Bristol Evening Post, Proteus
Site Details & Ownership:	The wharf is owned by Bristol City Council. Site accessible by vehicles from Eastway for deliveries, pedestrian access primarily via canal towpath owned separately by Canal and River Trust (formally British Waterways).
Project Reach / Visitors / Target Audience:	Aimed at engaging the local community through the beach, drinks, food and events. It attracted approximately 65,000 total visitors.
Problems Encountered / Overcome:	Standard planning submission, flood risk assessment, licensing, health and safety and insurances were time consuming.
Feedback from users / staff:	<i>"It's a neighbourhood social club."</i> Male, 60's. <i>"It's original and a bit surreal."</i> Male, 40's <i>"I wish it were here all year round."</i> Female, 30's
What next?	- The site of Redcliffe Wharf remains as car parking. - Sand was reused within the construction industry. And the bars constructed of timber were reused in a new location.
Project Website / Further Info:	http://www.demos.co.uk/projects/bristolurbanbeach


Delivery Map:

This map shows the relationship between the various project partners in the delivery of Bristol Urban Beach.




Delivery Characteristics:

This map shows the skills, characteristics and capacities held by various partners in the delivery of Bristol Urban Beach. Although the project broke even it was noted that the key drivers of the project; the social entrepreneur and the architect were not paid for their services or time.



Refined Model:

This map shows a proposed refined model learning from the experience of Bristol Urban Beach. It depicts a scenario where a social entrepreneur is placed in a paid role to deliver the expertise required to develop a business. If a certain percentage of profits were made they could be fed back into developing the built form or community objectives.




Business Model:

Bristol Urban Beach was administered under the umbrella of DEMOS Projects Ltd, a company limited by guarantee founded in 1991 by the think-tank DEMOS. The Urban Beach was a multi-functional space providing a range of services and activities in central Bristol.

The installation of food and drink outlets enabled the Urban Beach partners to sell to the public. The Urban Beach agreed a 50/50 profit share with the bar, which generated several thousand pounds of income. In addition, the food concessions paid a fee to be part of the beach, (c. £2,500 each). Other activities included events, workshops, deck chair hire, public art and the free provision of sports equipment.

The viability of the project was possible through a grant and sponsorship model. This allowed the Urban Beach to invest in necessary infrastructure to create facilities on site, but without having to commercialise these activities, i.e. deliver financial return to an investor, when running for a 6 week period. This was arguably a relatively high-cost model £120,000, for a six weeks, including some in-kind costs but stacked up as a result of Urban Beach's ability to attract generous investment from other sources.

Commercial and financial arrangement and statutory process



The commercial and financial arrangements included:

- A **lease** was agreed between the parties in early 2007 to run over a 6 week period. Bristol Urban Beach leased the land from the council on a temporary basis, having the right to occupy the site and pursue agreed activities for no fee.
- A small **grant** was also provided by the council alongside this lease as well as financial support from the now defunct Regional Development Agency. This grant was made beneath the RDA, council and EU procurement thresholds, and was made possible through the backing of one or two key figures within the council by identifying flexibility in budgets and underspend.
- There was no **procurement or commissioning** relationship between the partners. While the grant "investment" was accompanied by Terms and Conditions, there were no explicit goods, services, activities or outcomes (conditional on the funding) which the council expected to receive in return.
- The investment did not create expectation or possibility of **financial return** (eg debt, equity or risk capital) to the investor, in this case the council or RDA. The terms and conditions would have allowed for clawback in the case of breach of trust, but otherwise no financial return was foreseen.





Community Engagement

The civic entrepreneur at the heart of the scheme, Melissa Mean, became a member of the local Redcliffe Futures community group and also met the local tenants' association as part of a conscious effort to engage the local community. muf art projects undertook a public art commission which aimed to engage with local people, through a piece of creative research involving children from WUF (Waring Underdown and Francombe house / Avon Youth Association). The invited audience was:

*"SELECTED AS AN ACT OF SOCIAL ENGINEERING BRINGING TOGETHER THE DEVELOPER, COUNCIL OFFICERS, YOUNG PEOPLE, LOCAL SCHOLARS AND ARTISANS, IN ORDER TO REVEAL A DEMOGRAPHIC NORMALLY INVISIBLE WITHIN THE WIDER COMMUNITY."*¹

Community engagement was a challenge for the urban beach, since the site is dislocated from surrounding areas and adjacent communities. The urban beach project attempted to overcome this by reaching out to passers-by through the deliberate use of 'props' and informal engagement tactics.

Benefits and Success

From a number of perspectives, the Urban Beach project was seen as a success, particularly by its civic entrepreneurs, funders and visitors. Melissa Mean argues that the project was successful as a transformation of a public space in a democratic way. She also points to local calls for "Why can't we have that beach back?" as a succinct summary of its perceived success. The site attracted significant numbers of visitors, including from far afield, and activated a forgotten space, successfully exploiting its natural setting.

*"A GREAT PLACE IS NOT IN THE HANDS OF CITY HALL, A PLANNER OR AN ARCHITECT. INSTEAD IT DEPENDS ON THE EVERYDAY CREATIVITY AND PARTICIPATION OF THE PEOPLE WHO LIVE, WORK AND PLAY THERE."*²

On the other hand, the project could be said to have 'failed' in terms of its ability to self-fund and self-replicate, and was arguably relatively expensive for a 6 week project. In retrospect it has also failed to point the way towards appropriate longer-term development, perhaps in part as a result of its own intrinsic success - people want a beach!

¹ <http://www.muf.co.uk/ride.htm>

² Mean, M. JOhar, I. Gale, T: DEMOS, Report: (2008) The Bristol Beach: an experiment in place-making. 30

Summary of findings

The Urban Beach case study highlights a range of findings with potential wider significance for future meanwhile land use.

- (1) Melissa Mean and Indy Johar argue that there is a significant challenge for civic entrepreneurs to bring together and finance a diverse set of skills, including

“MEDIA AND MARKETING, FUNDRAISING, DESIGN AND ARCHITECTURE, CIVIL ENGINEERING, CONSTRUCTION, HEALTH AND SAFETY, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION, EVENT PROGRAMMING, SOUND ENGINEERING, SECURITY AND WASTE MANAGEMENT. THIS KIND OF COLLABORATIVE WORKING CUTS ACROSS MANY DIFFERENT ORGANISATIONS AND THEREFORE HAS HIGH TRANSACTION COSTS. FUNDING FOR PROJECTS TENDS STILL TO BE MORE READILY AVAILABLE FOR THE CAPITAL COSTS WHILE THE NEED TO RESOURCE THE PROCESS FOR COLLABORATION IS LARGELY UNRECOGNISED.”¹

- (2) The necessary funding and regulatory patchwork to underpin the viability of meanwhile projects can be equally challenging. The voluntary and community sector has long understood that entrepreneurs and activists working between conventional organisational boundaries (and/or in areas of market or government failure), face a time-consuming and complex task to piece together diverse funding streams to make a project stack up. Such projects can fall between or cut across budgets and policies targeted specifically at place-making, events, arts, enterprise, regeneration and the built environment. The task of joining up is arguably only for the “BRAVE, STUPID AND PASSIONATE.”²

It is not clear whether overcoming such challenges should rely on, in Melissa Mean’s words, hers and others’ ability to “WEAVE BEHIND THE EDGE OF FORMAL FUNDING STRUCTURES”³ or alternatively, as Clive Dutton suggests,

“IT IS VITAL THAT MEANWHILE PROJECTS ARE SUPPORTED THROUGH THE RED TAPE REQUIRED.”⁴

Perhaps, the onus, is on the entrepreneur to do the financial ‘stitching,’ while support navigating the legal hurdles can come from a catalytic public body. Either way, it may be useful for civic entrepreneurs to recognise that the council does not always act in unison. Experience, motivation, appetite for risk, and performance incentives vary across the desks and inbetween governing institutions.

- (3) Financial support often only materialises due to high-level sponsorship of senior champions working behind the scenes in a public body, flexibilities in discretionary budgets, underspend and below formal procurement thresholds. As meanwhile becomes more mainstream, finding appropriate funding becomes something of a conundrum for those public bodies that are seeking to enable successful meanwhile use.

1 Mean, M. JOhar, I. Gale, T. DEMOS, Report: (2008) The Bristol Beach: an experiment in place-making. 29

2 Conversation with Melissa Mean, 2012

3 Conversation with Melissa Mean, 2012

4 Dutton, C. Armstrong, D. (2012) Volume 5 Number 4. Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal. The 4th dimension = Meanwhile London: 329



(4) Funding for the Urban Beach was predominantly directed towards the hardware and physical capital of infrastructure, groundworks and portable toilets rather than the software and human capital of the civic entrepreneur and this is not uncommon in meanwhile projects. While entrepreneurs may be able to treat the resources they bring to a project as an investment, through enhanced CVs, reputation and cultural cachet of being seen to lead a successful and pioneering land use project - this is not a sustainable model if meanwhile use is to become mainstream in the UK.

(5) The ready-made existence of a suitable corporate vehicle was beneficial to administering the project and meant that the protagonists had one less battle to fight.

(6) The success of the project was to a large extent related to the suitability of the vision to the site. The particular characteristics of the physical setting will not always be so significant, but often still play an important part in determining success.

(7) The paradox at the heart of meanwhile use, is its short-term nature. It could be argued that a longer-term project would have been more commercially viable or in the summer season could move on to be replicated in other locations. However, the protagonists had little interest in prolonging their efforts and were satisfied with a 6-week run in one location. But if a project is successful, this is surely a waste.

(8) While meanwhile land use projects will be defined by activity arriving on unused space, many sites have a surrounding local community. The Urban Beach, and the Olympics site share the characteristic of being at a distance from a genuine community; a conundrum for community-led meanwhile use in the absence of community.

(9) The Urban Beach demonstrates the difficulty in appraising value for money or public support for such projects. The commercial relationship in this case was relatively generous and sub-commercial, although small. However, while the underlying business model was not commercially viable, in the sense of trading with the public or other businesses, it was viable through attracting significant sponsorship from a number of sources. When evaluating value for money of the council grant, we must consider the extent to which this enabled the Urban Beach to leverage further investment into Bristol (from private and regional public bodies). While the terms of the explicit relationship between the council and the Urban Beach were sub-commercial, they enabled significant investment in the city, which could justify the value for money of the investment. Given this, it seems that the financial relationship appropriately reflected the underlying business model. But questions remain around the overall level of investment in a very short, one-off project and whether this investment could have enabled the project to be repeated on the same site on a yearly basis or replicated elsewhere.

Meanwhile London was set up to help activate three sites into temporary 'destinations'. The Royal Docks and Canning Town, lie in a stretch of land, that runs from Stratford south, down the River Lea, to the Thames, and then east to Woolwich Reach. There is in excess of 22 billion of development potential amongst these sites. Caravanserai is one of three projects to win a competition, set up by Meanwhile London (read more on Meanwhile London on page 32).

CASE STUDY 4b- Caravanserai

Overview

Project summary:

Enclosed units with booths used by local community groups, artists and traders; food stalls and cafés. Built together with young people through apprenticeships. A program of gardening, performances, workshops and skills exchanges.

Location:

Silvertown Way, Canning Town, Newham, London, E16 1EA, UK

Programme:

School/ Retail street/ Cafe/ Daytime workshops/ Community Garden
Children's play space/ Exhibition Space

Initiator:

Newham Council and Meanwhile London

Project Duration:

2011 - 2017

Lead Time:

1 year

Site Area:

5060m²

Client Team:

Newham Council and Meanwhile London

Project Team:

Ash Sakula architects & Canning Town Caravanserai Ltd.

Opening Times:

Caravanserai is open at various times, depending on seasonality and scheduled events.

Funding Sources:

Newham Council £250, London Community Foundation, Development Trust Authority, British Council Youth in Action Trust, L&Q Foundation Neighbourhood Investment Fund, Newham Go For It Grants, etc.

Funding Type:

Grants, capital and volunteer funding

Project Costs (Build):

Labour (volunteers)	£ N/A
Construction Materials:	£6500
Water/Power connections:	£0
Permissions & Services:	£1250
Fine for billboard:	£80
Licensing fees:	£89

Profitability/Loss:

N/A

Permissions / Permits:

LB Newham





Local Links:

Anchor House, Community Links, East London Small, Businesses, Newham Visual Artists Network, Core Arts, Arch1, Shipman Youth Centre, The Good Gym, St Lukes, Ground Work, University of East London, London Trade School, etc

Publicity/advertising:

Local press, social media, local flyering and door to door conversations, event partner's publicity

Site Details & Ownership:

The site is owned by Newham Council. It sits along side the historic Silk Road, Canning Town. Silk Road runs parallel to Silvertown Way, connecting the existing temporary allotments, the Caravanserai and the Children's City to the south.

Project Reach / Visitors / Target Audience:

The Caravanserai is a new public space. It is intended to be a tactical start in creating a physical place and it is expected to be a shared place through making things together and through exchanges between people from different backgrounds and disciplines.

Problems Encountered / Overcome:

No power, water or foul drainage on site to tap into. Lack of capacity, finance and footfall. The facilities and events were only just starting to bring in a regular crowd in Sept 2012.

Feedback from users / staff:

Blog can be found at <http://caravanserai.org.uk/blog/site/>

What next?

£10,000 was granted by the National Lottery. The site still does not have mains electricity, a toilet, or a dedicated coordinator. They are improving their business support offer for local traders and event frequency; recruiting traders, artists and facilitators; establishing mechanisms for democratic community-led delivery and oversight; and working towards a self-sustaining income.

Project Website / Further Info:

www.caravanserai.org.uk


Delivery Map:

This map shows the relationship between the various project partners in the delivery of Caravanserai.




Delivery Characteristics:

This map shows the skills, characteristics and capacities held by various partners in the management and delivery of Caravanserai. The architecture firm which has managed this project has had to do so along side other commitments. This in itself does not necessarily affect the project's success; other factors such as footfall and activities etc. also play a key role.



Refined Model:

This map shows, a proposed, refined model, learning from the experience of Caravanserai. Similar to Bristol Urban Beach, it proposes a paid role, to deliver the project, with the energy and drive, which is required, to create a new business. Alternatively, the project management role could be given to an individual, or franchise to deliver, without the requirement for a paid role for start-up. This model also depicts a share of the profit to be invested back into the built environment or community objective.



NB:

This model differs only from the 'refined' model of Bristol Urban Beach in that The civic entrepreneur is an architect.

Business Model:

Caravanserai is a Community Interest Company Limited by Guarantee founded by Cany Ash in 2011.


Caravanserai is intended to be a “trading post”. The construction of several small market stalls, a small covered stage, a bar and workshop space potentially allow Caravanserai to attract revenue to the site, either through the direct management of these facilities or through franchising / outsourcing.

Commercial viability of the site is still very uncertain, not least as a result of the lower than expected footfall around the site in the crucial first few months’ trading. Regardless of future footfall, Caravanserai’s strategy for generating revenue over the coming months is also still uncertain. Currently, several activities are being trialled, including foreign language classes and the hire of the small trading kiosks. There are also plans for allotment style small agricultural plots. None of these, however, are expected to bring in significant revenue.

The viability of the enterprise is therefore based on a relatively low-cost model, capitalising on volunteer time, pro bono support, material donations, cross-subsidising the lead civic entrepreneur’s time from her more commercial activities off site, and through attracting grants from philanthropic or public sources.

Commercial and financial arrangement and statutory process

- A lease was agreed between the parties in early 2012 to continue until 2017. Caravanserai leases the land from Newham Council on a temporary basis, having the right to occupy the site and pursue agreed activities for no fee.
- The Local Authority has neither granted nor invested in the development of the site. Investment in infrastructure has only been possible through Caravanserai raising resources, time and materials from other sources.
- There is no procurement or commissioning relationship between the partners. However, The lease, includes terms and conditions (which are perceived by Caravanserai as onerous), as well as the right for the landlord to share in potential profits.





Benefits and Success

While it is too early to evaluate overall success of the project, two lessons already are clear. First, that the project is relatively successful in comparison to the other case studies of Meanwhile London projects. At the very least it is still in operation. On the other hand, it is barely successful in its own right – with almost no income, very low footfall and limited activity on site albeit there has been many involved in building temporary structures.

The project as it stands succeeds in creating a space, which is possibly like no other in the UK – giving the visitor a curious, half-finished, dusty and exotic forgotten marketplace.

The original aims of the Meanwhile London project included :

- Remediation of brownfield land, which was largely unusable for 40 years (having attracted crime and vandals);
- Vibrancy and animation;
- Attracting a high volume of new visitors to Newham, at times 30,000 on a weekend;
- Creating a temporary hub for the community, increasing the amount of commercial floor-space, cafes, bars, play areas and artist commissions;
- Creating significant employment and training opportunities, including for those who may otherwise be marginalised;
- Increase in property values;
- Changing the place brand of the area;
- Driving the creative economy;
- Supporting local companies and artists; and
- Generating positive publicity both in press and by word of mouth.

Through discussions with various stakeholders it seems that very few of these have been achieved, if indeed any at all. Establishing the market potential, rather than the strategy adopted, 'to build' and to hope people would come has affected the projects success.

Summary of findings

Meanwhile London was a competition, launched by the London Borough of Newham and the London Development Agency (LDA) in November 2010. The aim was to transform three derelict sites in the Royal Docks and Canning Town in the run-up to the 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games through innovative temporary uses.

The four winning projects were:

- Caravanserai for the Canning Town site: proposed by EXYST, Space Makers Agency, Ash Sakula and others, who aim to create a “adaptable open courtyard surrounded by busy shops and production spaces, collaboratively produced by architects, thinkers, makers, community groups and local residents”.
- 21st Century Pleasure Gardens for the Pontoon Dock site: proposed by the creators of Shangri-La at Glastonbury - Strong and Co. A “waterside festival site” to feature year-round attractions and summer-time spectacles.
- Industri[US] for the Royal Business Park site: proposed by Fluid, with Colliers International, Dare and others. Their concept aims to rework and revalue found materials and waste products, bringing together artists, entrepreneurs, social businesses, local people and scientists. Newham Council and the LDA will work this ambitious project so it can be extended to use other sites in the borough
- Royal Docks Baths for Pontoon Dock: proposed by Studio Egret West, this will be a “floating swimming pool in Pontoon Dock made from seven re-used Thames Lighters to form a pontoon, floating structure, cafe restaurant and spa”.

Each of the winning projects has met with significant challenges, with the most high profile, London Pleasure Gardens, in administration. Reasons for the mixed success of the projects include:

- Loss of a project champion within the public body which sponsored the event
- Footfall not living up to assumptions
- Interesting architectural proposals not matched by a robust commercial model
- Terms and conditions attached to the leases which made it extremely difficult to attract external investment
- Issues with the agility, clarity of purpose and multiple personality of public sector partners
- Mistakes made by practitioners, such as duplicate ticket sales.

The findings below list the Lessons learnt from our more developed research into one of these Meanwhile London winners, Canning Town - Caravanserai.

(1) That a lack of clarity up front has hindered the development of the site. Cany Ash was initially under the impression that the site would include residential units which promised the possibility for a pop-up hotel.

(2) That a “no cost, no revenue”¹ model is an entirely legitimate, albeit problematic way to pursue meanwhile land use. It is problematic in that the lack of investment in basic infrastructure, groundworks, plumbing, electricity and toilet facilities create immovable limitations to the potential of the site. The commercial relationship in the case of Caravanserai is almost non-existent and is limited to a right to occupy. The underlying business model is also fragile and barely commercial. The potential of the project therefore reflects the financial relationship of the project. However, this does raise the question as to whether some investment from the council or a partner could potentially have created a more commercially viable and successful project, potentially delivering financial return to the investor as well other benefits to the landlord, such as reputational and appreciation of land value. On the other hand it may have been a shrewd strategy by the public body to take very little financial risk with a site which is difficult to commercialise in the short-term. Caravanserai is arguably taking a more hand-to-mouth project approach rather than an ambitious enterprise strategy based on investment and commercial return.

(3) Inaccurate initial assumptions of the level of footfall past the site (for both Caravanserai and the other Meanwhile London projects) have significantly sapped the energy and enthusiasm of those close to the project and undermined the longer-term commercial potential of the sites. It is not clear whether these assumptions were part of a wider collective national fantasy in advance of the Olympics or due to individual error of a few public officials. Either way, the lesson is that accurate and reliable market intelligence can be crucial to the success of a meanwhile project.



"LONDON'S PLEASURE GARDENS (LPG) IS THE LARGEST AND MOST AMBITIOUS MEANWHILE, OR POP-UP PROJECT, THAT LONDON HAS EVER SEEN. ITS AMBITIONS, SHARED VALUES AND AIMS ALSO MAKE IT THE BIGGEST EXAMPLE OF FOCUSED AND PLANNED REGENERATION THROUGH TEMPORARY USE THAT THERE HAS EVER BEEN IN THE UK"¹

(4) The success of projects can be significantly influenced by the role of influential leaders within public bodies, and therefore timing and changes in personell. Clive Dutton at Newham and Peter Bishop at the LDA were seen to have played crucial roles in supporting the development of the Meanwhile London project, yet both had moved on by the time 2 of 3 projects had collapsed. The informal influence of key figures or politicians can, however, create tensions vis-à-vis procurement law and state aid rules. And where an enthusiastic public body is seeking to catalyse meanwhile use, it must also guard against the risks of seeking to do too much. For example, providing the delivery partner with direct property and legal expertise. In such cases, the public body may struggle to play both 'good' and 'bad' cop and negotiate two sides of the same deal.

(5) Where meanwhile sites are adjacent or clustered, public bodies with an overview should attempt to understand how they may complement or undermine each other's viability. This can be done by either creating a critical mass or diluting the concentration of visitors.

(6) In common with other case studies examined here, the planning rules can be surmounted quickly with high level support from within the local and/or city authority.

(7) Public bodies should consider the financial case for meanwhile use beyond a simple income and expenditure mind-set. For example, by considering the financial costs of inactivity and leaving land redundant e.g. the security liability of London Pleasure Gardens, for example, was £120k per year. Land values can also increase/ decrease due to meanwhile use, by far more than the amount of money which changes hands under a lease of grant relationship. Factoring land value into the terms of the financial relationship could have enhanced the incentives and future revenue prospects to enable Caravanserai to raise capital and invest in the site, at little risk to the landlord. As above, the local authority have instead, retained the rights to financial success, but have perhaps passed up the opportunity to create incentives which work in both partners' interest.

(8) Public bodies should consider lease agreements in the light of how they would also appear to external investors. Ensuring that a lease is 'investable' and therefore enabling the inflow of money into the project may be more likely to increase the chances of success and thus financial benefit to the public body than the seemingly more risk averse approach of limiting risks through a lease biased towards the landlord.

(9) Competitions to identify suitable partners to deliver meanwhile projects should reach out to a diverse range of potential partners. Relying on Design for London's established networks and stakeholder database resulted in a collection of bids heavily driven from the architecture and design community and a limited number from the wider social enterprise, event management, farming, and widget-making communities, for example. Architects and designers may not always be best placed to undertake the roles of business planning, product development, market testing, and project management.



Plot 3 was an active car park servicing Temple Meads station in Bristol. In January 2012 Bristol City Council (BCC) set up a meeting, inviting social and creative entrepreneurs and the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) to discussions. After further negotiations, the plans that the HCA had for the site were replaced with plans led by the network of entrepreneurs, some of whom became the directors of Creative Common CIC.

CASE STUDY 4c- Creative Common CIC

Overview

Project summary:	Previously the site was a car park for commuters and office workers in the vicinity of Temple Meads Station, Bristol. The site is occupied by an events tent in the spring/summer seasons with the aim to develop the site with a bar/ restaurant and retail units over the next few years.		
Location:	Enterprise Zone, Plot 3, Temple Meads, Bristol.		
Programme:	Events Bar Markets Future: Retail & Restaurant		
Initiator:	Bristol City Council & HCA		
Project Duration:	3 years (Opened 24th June 2011)		
Lead Time:	6 months		
Site Area:	985m ²		
Client Team:	Bristol City Council		
Project Team:	Invisible Circus, Circomedia, Art Space Life Space, Coexist, Common Capital, Coda Architects and later through the formation of Creative Common CIC. Bristol City Council provided below groundworks.		
Opening Times:	Creative Common is currently open six months of the year. Daily opening times depend on the range of scheduled events, often held in the evening.		
Funding Sources:	Home and Community Agency (HCA) £200,000 above ground work. £280,000 below ground work.		
Funding Type:	Grant		
Project Costs (Build):	Water/Power connections:	£280,000	
	Permissions & Services:	£8000	
Project Costs (Operational):	Initially forecast at £500,000 per year of which c. £375,000 was for circus and events		
Profitability/Loss:	Initially forecast at c. £100,000 after three years.		
Permissions / Permits:	Local Development Order (Planning), Temporary Event Licence, Fire Plan		
Local Links:	Arts based:- Invisible Circus, Circomedia, Art Space Life Space, Coexist. Coda Architects.		
Publicity:	Website, local advertising, venue magazine		

Site Details & Ownership: Land under ownership of the Homes and Communities Agency. Near railway station and adjacent to floating harbour. Relatively flat ground with public square neighbouring the site.

Project Reach / Visitors / Target Audience: Engaging residents from across Bristol with a variety of programmed events. A mix of uses to be established over time on the site. Bar/ Restaurant and retail space.

Problems Encountered / Overcome: Provision of power, water and foul drainage were provided to a site which previously was a car park. Time and energy was endured due to the different appetites for risk between public bodies, particularly the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) and external partners. This resulted in a slowdown in momentum and creativity. Some aspects of the project work were made more difficult by the initial limited capacity of the delivery partners in the start-up phase.

Feedback from users / staff: "It takes much grit and determination to deliver the spectacle of events which were on offer in the summer of 2012 at Creative Common. Not least because of the bureaucratic hurdles. The services, infrastructure, branding, marketing and management should also be applauded as an intrinsic part of the overall delivery."

What next? The tent has been brought down for the winter and the site currently (Nov 2012) sits vacant as plans start to formulate to re-appropriate the 'Common' for the spring of 2013. There is potential opportunity to create a bar/ restaurant and retail space to add a new dynamic to the events tent that occupied the site over the summer months.


Complimentary Programmes:


www.africaexpress.co.uk
www.hamiltonhouse.org
www.circomedia.com
www.invisiblecircus.co.uk
www.artspacelifespace.com
www.coda-architects.co.uk

Project Website / Further Info:

www.creativecommon.co.uk

Delivery Map:








Sketch Masterplan 19.03.12

CODA ARCHITECTS

CODA ARCHITECTS 11/3/2012.

Delivery Characteristics:

This map shows the skills, characteristics and capacities held by various delivery partners in the start-up phase.



Advantages
Ownership
A unique Identity
Preferred collaborators


Dis - Advantages
No Clear Driver
No Structure
Lacking decision making
Civic Entrepreneur value not recognised (wage)
Capacity





Refined Model:

This map shows, a proposed, refined model, learning from the experience of Creative Common. A notable challenge at the early stages of this project was the confused role of a key leader and experience to deliver. As a result, this scenario addresses some of those early problems which were unearthed.



Business Model:


Creative Common is a Community Interest Company Limited by Guarantee founded by Coexist CIC, The Invisible Circus and Art Space Life Space in June 2012.

Creative Common's business model is built around the establishment of a seasonal tented event space for 6 months of the year over 3 years. With capacity of over 1000, a well-connected city centre location, and a limited number of mid-sized event space alternatives in Bristol, revenue initially was expected to come from ticket sales, event hire and drink sales. The plot also offers the potential for wider revenue generating activities around the tent space, including retail, markets, workshops, restaurant and other commercial or semi-commercial activities.

Events so far have included Africa Express, the Invisible Circus' production The Happiness Machine and nightme markets.

The viability of the enterprise is based on assumptions around an on-going programme of attractive events, either managed in-house by Creative Common or licensed to others. The potential viability of the business is also supported by the success of the project partners in attracting resources from elsewhere, including a significant sum from the Arts Council England towards the circus event programme. Costs of the enterprise include tent hire, sound and lighting equipment, programme and event management, toilet provision, drinks, etc.

Commercial and financial arrangement and statutory process





The commercial and financial arrangements include:

- A lease was agreed between the HCA and Creative Common in the first half of 2012 to continue until Spring 2015. Creative Common leases the land from the HCA on a temporary basis, having the right to occupy the site and pursue agreed activities for no fee.
- The HCA has invested over £200k in the form of a grant via Bristol City Council and through Circomedia as the accountable body. Much of this contributes to the leasing of the tent, as well as some capital acquisition of lighting and sound equipment (owned by Creative Common) plus overheads. This grant was made under a pre-existing framework agreement between BCC and Circomedia.
- There is no formal procurement or commissioning relationship between the partners, although there is a Service Level Agreement in place. This outlines the activities which HCA and BCC expect to see delivered on site.
- The grant does include provision for the possibility of financial return to the investor, based on a percentage of any outstanding assets at the end of the 3 years, as well as a percentage of any profit. The precise balance of risk and return is to be agreed at a later date following a process outlined in the service level agreement (SLA).

Community Engagement

The surrounding areas has limited residential use but high footfall from Temple Meads station and a significant number of modern commercial offices. The project was initially met with some suspicion by the local business community. One business based in an office overlooking the site wrote to the Prime Minister, objecting to the light touch planning regime of Enterprise Zones. Subsequent efforts have been made to reach out to the local business community.

Benefits and Success

While it is too early to conclude on the success of the project as a whole, it is clear that the development has had a mixed reaction. For some, it is a remarkable symbol of the creative and independent spirit of Bristol, genuinely enterprising and with its doors open to the city (in contrast to other Enterprise Zones across the country where activity has stalled). For others, it is a disappointment that the full range of potential meanwhile activities has not yet been fulfilled - the space is merely a "scruffy tent in a windy car park" - as opposed to a multi-functional creative, social and green enterprise platform. For others, the development is simply a mistake. The site was previously used as a car park and the new Creative Common replaces this existing use in the summer months.

Summary of Findings

The Creative Common project also provides us with some potentially wider lessons for those seeking to support successful meanwhile activity.

(1) The absence of a defined “delivery method” meant that the process to animate an empty site was relatively negotiated and ad-hoc in contrast to a more structured process driven by one lead agency (as seen in the top-down Meanwhile London competition or the bottom-up entrepreneur-led approach of the Urban Beach). The project evolved as an informal network of creative entrepreneurs made a case to a landlord and a city council who were already themselves keen to see meanwhile activity on the site but had no formalised process for how this would be brought into existence. In theory this could have represented a fairer, more balanced approach to partnership, with two sides coming together and moving apart at various stages, and eventually agreeing the terms of engagement (see Julia Unwin’s seminal *The Grant-making Tango*). In practice, however, it led to a rather tortuous and unpredictable journey, characterised by complex patterns of communication, uncertainty and changing expectations along the way.

(2) The complex web of accountability, the dual roles of the HCA (as more risk averse landlord) and Bristol City Council (proactively seeking to catalyse creative enterprise), and the range and diverse motivations of the practitioners (with different visions for the site) provoked confusion, delays and tensions as the project has progressed. For example, with the Service Level Agreement, there is a significant risk that the presence of 4 accountable bodies in the supply chain risks confusing lines of accountability and potentially compromises performance management. Where these different perspectives have caused delays, this in turn has potentially undermined the viability of the project. As Dutton and Armstrong point out: “A characteristic of Meanwhile is that it can achieve very fast results: this does, however, mean that lengthy delays could prove terminal for projects with such short life spans, as it greatly reduces the amount of time they have available to become commercially viable.”¹

(3) The commercial relationship between the public bodies and the delivery partner is relatively generous and sub-commercial. The underlying business model is potentially profitable, albeit unsecured and high risk. It seems appropriate, therefore, that the HCA / BCC have invested on terms that more or less reflect the risks of the underlying business model, by including the potential for a profit share. The HCA and BCC, therefore, have the potential to share in any upside. However, with terms to be confirmed (for example, there may be a discrepancy between the BCC/HCA right to a percentage of any outstanding assets and their right to a percentage of profits) this could create perverse incentives for Creative Common (e.g. to sell any assets on the last day of trading). The lesson here is perhaps that public funders need to think more carefully about not only the financial terms of any investment, but also the incentives these can create for delivery partners. The terms of the investment in this case were never clear at the beginning of negotiations and this lack of clarity arguably created problems in negotiations further down the line.

1 Dutton, C. Armstrong, D. (2012) Volume 5 Number 4, *Journal of Urban Regeneration and Planning*, 4th dimension = Meanwhile London: 328



Source: <https://maps.google.co.uk/>



(4) It was also mooted at one point in negotiations that Creative Common could share in any potential appreciation in the value of the land on which the meanwhile use is taking place. Interim activity could feasibly lead to an increase in the value of the land, demonstrating commercial viability, footfall and testing local appetite for various longer term uses. By not including this in the eventual agreement, BCC/HCA have, on one hand, retained the maximum share of one consequence of financial success. On the other hand BCC/ HCA have reduced the incentive for Creative Common to manage the space with a view to the long-term success, which may perversely compromise any potential upside for the landowners.

(5) As with the Urban Beach, a further consideration for BCC (and perhaps less so for the HCA) is the extent to which financial support for Creative Common has leveraged further investment into Bristol. While the terms of the explicit relationship with Creative Common may not prove to be commercially comparable in their own right, they appear to have already attracted hugely significant investment in the city, which could alone arguably justify the value for money of the investment in terms of the Bristol local and national taxpayer.

(6) Creative Common's approach to their business model and financial management, can be seen to be risk averse, hand-to-mouth, or an 'income and expenditure' project approach, as opposed to a more ambitious 'balance sheet' enterprise strategy of investing available resources up front in order to deliver greater returns over time. This is perhaps symptomatic of the tripartite governance of the delivery body and consequent negotiated vision, as opposed to one single vision followed through with according commitment and ambition to making the project all it could be. However, it is still early days in this respect.

(7) It should be noted that the business model is, to a significant extent, predicated on events and the sale of alcohol and other refreshments during these events. Creative Common then has much in common with other meanwhile projects, which have at their heart the sale of food and drink (particularly alcohol) and is crucial to their financial viability (e.g. Frank's Campari Bar, the Filling Station, most festivals, etc.). At the ill-fated Bloc event at London Pleasure Gardens, drinks sales allegedly reached over £250k in just a few hours.

(8) The ebbs and flow of the roles of various actors in the Creative Common project at different stages in its development suggests how meanwhile projects, like indeed any enterprise, may need to call on different skills and experience over the lifecycle of the project. For example, those who were best suited to developing the vision and making the case to the public bodies, in terms of architectural expertise, financial modelling and securing high level stakeholder support were not necessarily the best people to take forward events and project management, marketing, etc. It is not clear from the Creative Common experience how best to manage the process of various players coming forward and stepping back. Perhaps to some extent it relies upon individual self-awareness and actors' willingness to pass on ownership of their vision to others, or conversely, deliver someone else's.

(9) Creative Common reminds us that community does not always refer to local inhabitants, citizens and community as intended in the sense of The Department for Communities, community action and community empowerment. In this case, the community were professionals in glass and steel office blocks overlooking the site.

CASE STUDY 4d- Diesel Depot

Overview

Project summary:	The Severn Project CIC is a social integration project set up in 2010 to provide services to socially excluded individuals through the initiation of ethical businesses providing education, training and employment.	
Location:	Enterprise Zone, Diesel Depot, Bristol	
Programme:	Growing - On this site 200 and 400 kgs of organic food is hoped to be grown. Mineral rich speciality salad, giving the Severn Project a weekly income of between £1,500 and £3,000.	
Initiator:	Homes and Communities Agency (HCA)	
Project Duration:	2 years (Opened Sept 2012)	
Lead Time:	6 weeks	
Site Area:	3 acres	
Client Team:	Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) and Bristol City Council	
Project Team:	The Severn Project CIC	
Opening Times:	Diesel Depot is not open to the public without prior arrangement.	
Funding Sources:	HCA £40,000	
Funding Type:	Grant	
Project Costs (Build):	Labour (inc. volunteers)	£ 17,000
	Construction Materials:	£35,000
	Water/Power connections:	£000
	Permissions & Services:	£000





Site Details & Ownership:	The site is the former Bath Road diesel depot next to Temple Meads Station. Formally owned by RDA now under the control of HCA.
Project Website / Further Info:	http://thesevernproject.org/
Project Costs (Operation):	Staffing: £52,000 per annum Construction Materials: £35,000
Profitability/Loss:	Income forecast at £100,000 per year. Cost not disclosed.
Permissions / Permits	Local development order (Planning) Temporary event licence Fire plan
Local Links:	N/A
Publicity/advertising	Facebook and Twitter

Project Evaluation:

Site Details & Ownership:

The site is on the former Bath Road diesel depot next to Temple Meads Station. Formally owned by RDA now under the control of HCA. The site is valued at approximately £100 million and has been earmarked for an events arena for several years. The site was contaminated by previous uses. Silver mine, gas storage depot, diesel depot and the Local Authority spent £36 million decontaminating the site. Risk assessments suggest that the ground is still contaminated to a large degree.

Project Reach / Visitors / Target Audience:

N/A

Problems Encountered / Overcome:

The route for grant funding had to be channelled through the safer Bristol partnership who 'The Severn Project' had previously won a contract with. This was to provide social re-integration for those suffering from the effects of substance misuse. Contaminated soil was an issue which was overcome by providing non permeable membrane below 100mm gravel (for drainage) then terram, then 400mm imported soil. Access was a problem, in relation to turning into oncoming traffic on the main road. This was overcome by emailing all visitors before they entered the site.

Feedback from users / staff:

Delivery of products grown on site is easier than from other Severn project locations.

What next?

Consolidate, social franchising, fundraising, adult apprenticeship programmes

Complimentary Programmes:


N/A

Project Website / Further Info:

www.thesevernproject.org

Delivery Characteristics:

This map shows the skills, characteristics and capacities held by the single organisation in the delivery of the Urban Farm



KEY:

- Outsourced/ External Partners
- Core Characteristics / Skills
- Partner Delivery Components
- Entrepreneur Delivery Components

- Visionary
- Community Leader
- Architect

NB:

Skills which did not feature as prominently as in the alternative vision of the temporary use of the site.

Advantages

- Ownership
- Independent Activity
- Small scale requires no organisational structure
- Ease of decision making
- A unique Identity
- Preferred collaborators
- Capacity




Dis - Advantages

- Smaller scale approach to job growth
- Foot fall limited
- No mix of use
- No pay back for investor
- Narrower approach to community engagement



Refined Model:

This map shows a proposed refined model learning from the experience of the Diesel Depot and building towards a more engaging, ambitious and multi- functional use.



Business Model:


The Severn Project is a Community Interest Company founded by Steve Glover in 2010. The Diesel Depot site will be the “central growing and distribution hub” for The Severn Project’s agricultural production in Bristol over the next few years.

The installation of 7 x 30m x 6.5m polytunnels will enable The Severn Project to cultivate half an acre of year-round growing space. The business model is to generate revenue from the sale of organic vegetables and micro-salads to restaurants and others in the Bristol area.

The Severn Project’s products include carrots, leeks, turnips, potatoes, salad leaves, micro-leaves herbs and other vegetables. The Severn Project estimate that they can sell £15k of food before the end of 2012, and around £10k per month thereafter. This would generate c. £100k in the first year and up to £200k over two years. To finance the project, Steve Glover borrowed 15k from a local High Net Worth Individual to help support cashflow and has previously received an UnLtd Level 1 grant.

The viability of the enterprise is based on a relatively low-cost model, capitalising on volunteer time, and cross-subsidised through other related service provision, including training provision and qualification accreditation. Costs include heating the tunnels in the winter months, seeds and transport, waste disposal and portable toilet.

Commercial and financial arrangement and statutory process





The commercial and financial arrangements include:

- A lease was agreed between the parties for £1 to run from Sept 2012 until June 2014. The Severn Project leases the land from the HCA on a temporary basis, having the right to occupy the site and pursue agreed activities for no fee.
- The HCA has invested £52k in the form of a predominantly capital grant channelled via Bristol City Council's Safer Bristol Partnership Board. The acquisition of polytunnels (for £7.5k), and soil results in assets which are owned by The Severn Project. This grant was made via the BCC and was possible through the existing framework agreement between the Safer Bristol Partnership and The Severn Project.
- There is no procurement or commissioning relationship between the partners. While the grant "investment" is accompanied by terms and conditions (which, for example, specify the depth of soil in the plating beds), there are no explicit goods, services, activities or outcomes conditional on the funding that the HCA or BCC expects to receive in return.
- Neither does the investment create expectation (e.g. debt) or possibility (e.g. equity or risk capital) of financial return to the investor, in this case the HCA. The terms and conditions allow for clawback in the case of breach of trust but otherwise no financial return to the HCA is foreseen.

Community Engagement

While there is no community on, or directly adjacent to the site, the story of the Diesel Depot site is closely linked to a local community of interest. Bristol has a strong history of environmental engagement and an active community of people working and arguing for a greener approach to economic development, more sustainable food production, local food networks, etc. A group of people interested in the possibility of using the Diesel Depot for a highly visible, large scale, flagship urban agriculture project had been convened by Keith Cowling, a local community activist and social entrepreneur. This is perhaps the nearest the site has to an engaged community.

Benefits and Success

From a more pragmatic social entrepreneur Steve Glover, the project is hugely successful already. The enterprise is receiving investment on generous terms, moving physically closer to its market, cutting costs and strengthening its balance sheet. Steve also suggests that success should be defined more widely, including the view point of clients and staff, the public bodies and the wider city of Bristol.

From the perspective of this wider community of interest, embodied by Keith Cowling, the project has been a failure; not living up to the ambitious vision which was considered for the site. A smaller, less visible and less engaging project now occupies the site, not meeting the rather grander expectations that Keith and others had developed.

From the landlord's perspective, it seems the HCA just wanted "something to happen" on the site, - and quickly. This has been achieved. HCA may also have succeeded in making security savings and mitigating other potential risks on leaving the land empty. The project is also successful in terms of activating a relatively awkward space with difficult vehicle access. However, the project will not attract any additional footfall and (while the polytunnels are indeed visible from the platform at Temple Meads station) has no great visibility.

Summary of Findings:

Regardless of the perspective on success, the Diesel Depot experience provides some lessons which can have wider application for meanwhile land use.

(1) The public sector - as either funder or landlord - can reduce transaction costs, wasted time and attract the most relevant proposals for land use with the best chances of success by providing clarity around the terms and length of tenure and the availability of financial support. In this case, the landlord may have held back from being open about the amount of money available in order to encourage a more prudent approach from those with an interest in the site. In practice, this may have simply wasted the time of those who were forced to make assumptions about the financial envelope. As with Creative Common, a negotiated approach seems to have created more confusion and complexity than a process led by one key actor. Even within the council, there appears to have been some confusion with the arts team planning to use the site for a music festival unbeknownst to those considering meanwhile agricultural use.

(2) The Diesel Depot experience reveals a spectrum of civic entrepreneurial approaches. To one stereotyped extreme is the opportunistic entrepreneur who prioritises action, thinks in terms of the possible, what the customer wants and how he or she can deliver within the given boundaries. On the other end, is the more lofty and strategic visionary, who seeks to achieve an aspiration by investing time and effort in more formal business planning and consultation before taking action. This is perhaps linked to a spectrum of scale of ambition for meanwhile use: alternatively as a small, light-touch, community-led temporary phenomenon or in some cases as a more ambitious and scaleable, medium term commercial activity.

(3) As in other cases, the planning context was resolved very quickly thanks to supportive pressure from supportive public sector partners. This was made easier, as with Creative Common, by the location of the site within the lightly regulated Enterprise Zone.

(4) The commercial relationship in this case is relatively generous and sub-commercial yet the underlying business model is potentially sustainable and profitable, albeit fragile and reliant pro bono contributions. Given this, it seems arguable whether the HCA have secured maximum value for money, for the taxpayer from the establishment of the lease and capital grant arrangement with The Severn Project. Although the taxpayer may benefit more widely through the impact of the activity on site. For the HCA there is low risk; the project is seen to be flourishing in its own right and proves financially profitable; that the assets retain some residual value at the end of the 2 years; or that it provides a sound basis for the wider Severn Project enterprise to grow. However, the HCA has foregone the opportunity for the taxpayer to share in any potential financial upside. This appears to be a missed trick.

(5) This interim activity is unlikely to lead to an increase in value of land. It is arguably difficult for urban agriculture to stand up commercially against rural alternatives over the longer-term. While it may be possible in the short-term, this relies on cheap land, significant pro bono contributions, direct subsidy, or cross-subsidy from other related on-site activities (e.g. training, etc.). Therefore even a successful project over 2 years by the Severn Project is not going to enhance the value of the land.

(6) While the land value may not have been a factor, public bodies can sometimes be quite blinkered in thinking only in terms of cash out the door rather than a more rounded balance sheet approach. Assets such as the polytunnels and the soil may have an on-going value and this can be factored into the financial terms. A case can be made, however, that for only £40k of taxpayers money, complicating the terms of the financial relationship would be disproportionate.

(7) The channelling of the money through the Adult Drug Treatment commissioner in this case demonstrates how meanwhile uses have so often demanded considerable flexibility from public bodies (where proposals do not logically fall under the domain of one part of the local authority).





SUMMARY OF LESSONS

LEARNT

As well as the specific lessons identified under each of the case studies above, this research outlines a number of other lessons for meanwhile land use.

Skills, Capacity and Capabilities

First, that the 4 case studies provided us with an overview of the nature and scope of the skills, capacity and capabilities that may be required for successful meanwhile land use delivery. These include 'soft' skills, capacity and capabilities, which may be more likely to be found within the civic entrepreneur:

- **Vision and leadership**
- **Energy and motivation**
- **Pro bono contribution**
- **Entrepreneurial drive to weave around, between and cuts across traditional organisational boundaries.**
- **Public relations (inc. public facing personality)**
- **Sensitive community engagement**
- **Harnessing network of people**
- **Harnessing network of funding streams**

They also include 'hard' skills, capacity and capabilities which may be more appropriate to contract from others or build around the lead entrepreneur. These include:

- **IT, web and social media**
- **Business Planning**
- **Project management**
- **Site management and security**
- **Financial management**
- **Programme management, artistic, leisure, creative (curatorial) expertise**
- **Event management, ticketing, sound and lighting engineering**
- **Architectural expertise and vision**
- **Construction, civil and structural engineering**
- **Legal, licensing, health and safety expertise**
- **Communication, marketing and branding, graphic design**
- **Risk management (e.g. delivery, financial, outcome, health and safety, etc.)**
- **Licensing, planning, building regulations, etc.**
- **Finance / fundraising**





THE FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIP

The four case studies prompted reflection on the nature of the financial relationship between funder and funded, landlord and occupier. Public, commercial or social sector organisation can engage in a number of financial relationships with a partner or partners. These can include:

Revenue / Funding / Income (e.g. payment for goods or services)

- **Commissioning / procurement** – where a customer pays a contractor for the delivery of specified goods, services, activities or outcomes
- **Revenue grant** – a more loosely defined arrangement than above, used to fund an activity that is in broad alignment with the funder's objectives.
- **Leasing / concession** – where a landlord is paid for allowing use, occupation, tenancy or rights over property or land

Capital / investment / finance (applying capital in expectation of impact over time)

- **Lending** – where there is an obligation to repay money to the investors, often with interest
- **Risk Capital** – where there is a possibility of repayment and risks and rewards are shared
- **Capital grant** – where there is no expectation of repayment

Each arrangement exhibits different characteristics of risk and return, which can also vary under each model. For example, a commissioned service provider may be under contract with payment guaranteed in advance or, at the other end of a spectrum of risk, with payment contingent on the delivery of outcomes. Each of these arrangements can be put in place in combination with others, for example, as a mix of grant and loan. These financial relationships can impact on an organisation's financial position (in this case LLDC) in terms of:

- **Accrued income and expenditure (money set to flow in and out)**
- **Cash-flow (when the money actually changes hands)**
- **Balance sheet (the value of any assets and liabilities, physical and otherwise)**

Another example is where a contractor may be commissioned to deliver a sculpture. While this represents an initial cost to the funder, it also may impact positively on their balance sheet - if the value of the sculpture, now owned by the funder increases over time. Equally, the value of land itself may appreciate through improvements made by meanwhile occupants or through demonstrating the commercial viability of a site. Alternatively, leasing land to occupants may deliver cost savings through reduced risk, security and maintenance. Too often it seems, landlords, funders and practitioners tend to think in terms of initial cash transfers and not enough about on-going investment income and expenditure, assets, liabilities and balance sheets.

Non-financial support

The diverse experience of the 4 case studies suggest that public or quasi-public landlords and funders should support the success of meanwhile developments by providing some of the essential tools and championing activity, engagement and publicity:

- **Infrastructure**
 - Waste
 - Water feed
 - Electricity feed
- **Foundations**
- **Storage space**
- **Sourcing materials**
- **Legal and financial support**
- **Signage around the site and specific to developments**
- **Hoardings, gates and access points**
- **Security arrangements**
- **Cash Machines and card readers**
- **Wi-Fi**
- **An integrated program of activities**
- **Monitoring, evaluation and continuous local engagement**
- **Toilets and showers (with access cards)**
- **Provide a key point of contact**

Experience suggests that the terms of the provision of this support need to be clear from the outset of a project. It is also helpful if they are set out explicitly in the grant or lease arrangements, for example, to avoid tensions arising from differing expectations. In cases where there are a number of sites or multiple meanwhile occupiers over space or time, it may be that these arrangements can be managed and brokered via an intermediary, platform or meanwhile development agency.





INTERLUDE- POTENTIAL MEANWHILE USES

"THE CRUX OF SOCIAL DESIGN IS WORKING WITH PEOPLE, RATHER THAN FOR THEM"

Hall, R. a. P. (2001) - Designing and Developing Accessible Environments, New York, Spon Press. 18

Developng future uses of land should be done through creative engagement techniques. The results are more likely to bring about unexpected and unique outcomes. Listed below are more standard uses which each of us encounter within the built environment.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------|
| - Mobile self-contained food serving | - Digital media |
| - Café | - Office space |
| - Restaurant | - Storage facilities |
| - Markets | - Community centre |
| - Workshop space (making) | - School |
| - Shops | - Healthcare building |
| - Specialist shop - Baking | - Visitors centre |
| - Recycling hub | - Exhibition Centre |
| - Gallery | - Trade Centre |
| - Events Space | - Skills Share Centre |
| - Arts installations | - Radio station |
| - Sports facilities | - Media station |
| - Cinema | - Youth Club |
| - Stage | - Brewery |
| - Gym | - Bank |
| - Well-being centre | - Children's Playground |
| - Cultural learning exchange | - Teenage Playground |
| - Club | - Adult Playground - Gym |
| - Bar | - Energy Station |
| - Public house | - Skate Park |
| - Museum | - Library |
| - Learning academy | - Urban Agriculture |

RECOMMENDATIONS

The lessons outlined in the previous section suggest a number of recommendations to support successful meanwhile land use for both public and quasi-public landlords and funders, practitioners and others.

PRACTITIONERS

Practitioners should:

- Prepare themselves for the fact that experience, motivation, appetite for risk and incentives vary differently across the desks of governing authorities.
- Seek to secure high-level sponsorship of senior champions, for example in the local authority, to facilitate progress behind the scenes.
- Have their eyes open to the significant challenge which meanwhile projects can represent in bringing together and financing a diverse set of skills; the attitudes, speed and appetite for risk of (quasi-) public bodies, funders, financiers, regulators and insurers when faced with non-conventional proposals for meanwhile land use with few precedents.
- Recognise that, often, the necessary funding, regulatory and collaboration patchwork to underpin the viability of meanwhile projects can be challenging and the onus is often on the entrepreneur to do the stitching, with significant transaction costs.
- Where possible and appropriate, utilise existing ready-made suitable corporate vehicle to avoid wasting time and resources on the complexity of creating a new vehicle from scratch for a short-term project
- Consider the needs, demands, expectations and preferences of the local community when designing and delivering their meanwhile activities. This includes less obvious interpretation of community, such as communities of interest or the local business community.
- Be aware that the perceived success of meanwhile use is subjective. Given this, practitioners should take forward their projects with due regard to how they wish to be perceived by a diverse and inclusive range of stakeholders.
- Be aware that different skills and capacities may be required at different stages in a project's life-cycle e.g. inception, start-up and delivery phases.
- Satisfy themselves on the robustness and accuracy of assumptions made by others e.g. around footfall, for example and other market intelligence.
- Consider carefully the appropriate place for their business model on a spectrum between a more hand-to-mouth "no cost, no revenue" 'income and expenditure' project model vs. a more ambitious invest and return enterprise model.
- Clearly identify one lead 'client relationship manager' to liaise with the landlord and/or funder.
- Understand the risks where projects can be significantly influenced by the role of influential leaders within public bodies, and therefore timings and changing of personnel.

"EFFECTIVE AND CONTINUOUS LOCAL ENGAGEMENT IS AN ESSENTIAL COMPONENT AND HELPS TO BUILD BOTH OWNERSHIP AND A DEGREE OF CERTAINTY INTO THE PROCESS. "¹

"THERE ARE MANY PEOPLE WHO WOULD NOT EMBRACE MEANWHILE, SIMPLY FROM FEAR OF THE UNKNOWN. IT IS LESS CHALLENGING TO LET A SITE LIE EMPTY, OR AT LEAST IT HAS BEEN. IT IS EASIER THAN EXPENDING THE TIME AND COST OF HAVING SOMETHING UNFAMILIAR, SOMETHING THAT IS NOT 100 PER CENT MAPPED OUT PRE-FUNDED AND MASTER-PLANNED, AND, WORST OF ALL, SOMETHING THAT MAY BE HARD TO GET OFF THE SITE."¹

LANDLORDS

Landlords should:

- Consider the financial case for meanwhile use beyond a simple income and expenditure mind-set. For example, by considering the financial costs and benefits of inactivity and leaving land redundant: the security liability, and land values, staff time and legal costs, for example.
- Be as clear as possible as early as possible about the duration, terms and tenure of the site.
- Consider providing a basic equivalent of a so-called Home Information Pack to give occupiers a clear basic understanding of the characteristics of the site to be occupied. This should include information and ideally, solutions for the basic infrastructure, groundworks, plumbing, electricity and toilet facilities on site.
- Be aware that when seeking to enable meanwhile activity across multiple sites, that a sufficient proportion of activities need to be attractions in themselves, while other less 'destination' activities may benefit from being clustered, and that sites should complement rather than undermine each other's viability
- Consider, encourage and select occupiers with regard to the suitability of their vision to the physical characteristics of the site and with a view to the demands, needs, expectations and preferences of the local community, community of interest or others with a vested interest in the site.
- Consider how meanwhile leases can be constructed to deliver maximum 'investability' e.g. providing sufficient security of tenure that practitioners are able to secure external investment.
- Attract a diverse range of potential occupants when advertising, holding competitions or issuing calls for ideas. For example, while architects and designers can be crucial to the successful delivery of meanwhile activity, other entrepreneurs, 'widget makers', But also through local community networks, university students, existing business looking to branch out, voluntary and community groups, social enterprises and local businesses may bring more entrepreneurial skill, established networks of pro bono support, successful products and services with a track record, etc.

"REGARDLESS OF WHO PAYS FOR OR PROFITS FROM DEVELOPMENT, EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO LIVE, WORK AND LEARN IN WELL-DESIGNED BUILDINGS, PLACES AND SPACES THAT INSPIRE AND LIFT THE SPIRITS AS WELL AS BEING FUNCTIONAL AND FIT FOR PURPOSE. GOOD DESIGN IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST."²

¹ Dutton, C. Armstrong, D. (2012) Volume 5 Number 4. Journal of Urban Regeneration and Renewal. The 4th dimension = Meanwhile
² CABE, <http://www.cabe.org.uk/corporate/strategy/why-good-design-matters>. 18.06.2010

"A MODEL THAT DOES NOT ALLOW FOR FLEXIBILITY OVER FUNDING IS NOT VIABLE IN THE CURRENT FINANCIAL CLIMATE. MANY OF THE START-UP PROJECTS WILL NEED FINANCIAL SUPPORT BUT THIS DOES NOT NEED TO BE THROUGH GRANTS. IT COULD BE THROUGH CREDIT GUARANTEE SCHEMES OR DIRECT LOANS, WHICH COULD THEN BE STRUCTURED SO THAT A SHARE OF THE PROFITS WOULD GO INTO SEEDING OTHER MEANWHILE PROJECTS."¹

FUNDERS AND PUBLIC BODIES

Funders and public bodies should:

- Recognise that there is a spectrum of commercial and community-led approaches to meanwhile use, with often much uncertainty in the financial viability of many meanwhile projects.
- Monitor the project to evaluate success and failure. Include, volunteer contributions, skills development etc.
- Therefore seek to construct a funding relationship which reflects the underlying business model of the occupier. This means thinking beyond leases, procurement and grants and developing profit sharing arrangements, investment and joint ventures. Where the funder is also the landlord, this may include factoring in appreciation in the value of land, property or other assets where this can enhance incentives in all parties' interest.
- Be as clear as possible as early as possible about the parameters of the potential terms of financial support.
- Clearly identify one lead 'case officer' to liaise with the meanwhile practitioner, and seek a similar one-point of contact from them
- Support practitioners to navigate the legal hurdles and planning regime.
- Not only provide financial support for hardware and physical capital of infrastructure, groundworks and temporary toilets but also to software and human capital of the civic entrepreneur. (i.e. do not assume this is to be voluntary.)
- Give due regard to procurement law, formal processes and state aid rules while maintaining a healthy appetite for risk, exploiting flexibility in discretionary budgets, and proportionate monitoring and reporting, procurement thresholds, etc.
- Ensure a consistent, fair and transparent approach to business rates, as a means to creating the right incentives, in the wider interest of the local authority.
- Develop methodologies for evaluating the value for money of financial support for meanwhile activity, which include consideration of:
 - o deadweight (what would have happened)
 - o security costs
 - o additional money leveraged towards the project from external sources
 - o land value
 - o any other savings
- Carefully manage the provision of non-financial support. In a case where a landlord expects to work across a number of sites or multiple meanwhile occupiers over space or time, it may be that these arrangements can be managed and brokered via an intermediary, platform or meanwhile support agency.
- Where multiple sites are under consideration for meanwhile use, consider the potential for such an intermediary to take on the role of delivering the financial and meanwhile strategy of the public body, acting as a fund manager or fully fledged meanwhile development agency, attracting investment from other sources and providing specialist meanwhile expertise. This would follow the development of a meanwhile investment model which enabled the public body to model a range of scenarios, each with different combinations of the financial relationships outlined above to present a range of possible investment strategies. This would give the public body or intermediary the necessary evidence, and analysis to practically put in place the relationships (procurement, investment, leasing, grant and lending) most likely to deliver, in combination, the desired financial and policy objectives.

STAGES OF WORK

Meanwhile Use - Development

(1) Engage and Consult

Understand the 'Community'
The stakeholders

- (a) Local community
- (b) Local creative and business sector
- (c) City Wide
- (d) Global

Catalyse on events to engage with a cross representation of the future end users and potential delivery partners. This will help establish unique set of uses for the urban landscape.

Masterplan as complex systems

(2) Establish Loosely the Typology and Infrastructure Required

(3) Deliver the Infrastructure

(4) Marketing

Publise within local and regional markets and networks to get the full spectrum of applications required to create a multi faceted web of uses.

Start-Up
Business

Complexity to stimulating the site.
Representation from across society.

(5) Publish Feedback from Consultation

(6) Commission and Weave Together Successful Proposals

(7) Deliver

Prioritise outcomes, revenue, expenditure and learning objectives

(8) Support, Develop & Monitor

(9) Curate Events & Activities

(10) Continue to Monitor & Evaluate

Communication
Manage expectations
through process and
delivery

Create growth and
development of site
through profits

CONCLUSION

We believe that meanwhile land use can offer potentially exciting opportunities to test and enable new models of entrepreneurship and innovation which blend economic, social and environmental motivations, just as the UK is crying out for alternatives to business as usual.

We are reassured that meanwhile practitioners are keen to share their experiences, so pioneers can help clear the ground to make it easier for others to follow. There can be no meanwhile land use rule book or one off-the-shelf business plan. But we are more likely to succeed through humility, sharing lessons learned and working together.

We see a crucial role for commissioners, procurement professionals and landlords - acting in their enlightened self-interest - to create the right incentives to enable successful meanwhile use, which in turn delivers them a return on their investment.

We are convinced that the success and viability of meanwhile land use will be driven not only through good design, architectural look-and-feel and the cultural cachet of innovation but are also grounded in the technical details, business models, commercial and financial arrangements which underpin each enterprise.

We know that success is contingent, not least upon the perceptions of the communities that have an interest in the sites on which meanwhile use take place. Appropriate engagement with relevant communities will inevitably play a role in success and the prospects for replication.


We are respectful of the range of skills, capacities and capabilities required for a multi-disciplinary, multi-functional start-up enterprise to literally build itself up from the ground.

So we wish the very best to those working to occupy this ground and enable the successful creative, commercial and community led animation of empty spaces across the UK and further afield.

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